Property's Uneasy Path and Expanding Future
Saul Levmoret
INTRODUCTION

How has law come to its present state and where is it going?
These are two obvious questions to ask on the occasion of a great Law
School's Centennial. In this Essay, I direct these questions at property
rights, a centerpiece of the law and economics revolution that has itself been an important part of this last century of ideas. The law and
economics literature has advanced the optimistic view that property
rights have evolved in a way that promotes economic efficiency.' I
suggest that alongside the conventional and optimistic view, which is
essentially transaction cost, or efficiency, based, there is an alternative
and skeptical view that is interest group, or politically, driven. And if
it is true that the evolution of property rights up to the present time is
capable of conflicting explanations, then there is the question of predicting the future of property rights and, as we will see, the future of
intellectual property in particular.
Part I begins by exploring two distinct stories about the evolution
of property rights. Part II then applies the two evolutionary stories to
assess the future of intellectual property rights. I suggest that we
should expect interest group pressures to generate an expansion of intellectual property rights, perhaps even to include protection for abstract ideas. These expanding rights will shape much of our legal system in the coming years. The conclusion adds some hopeful comments
about the limits of interest group politics.

t Dean and William B. Graham Professor of Law, The University of Chicago. I am grateful
for the guidance I received from Dean Bachus, Doug Lichtman, and Julie Roin.
I I should say that I normally subscribe to (and try to contribute to) the optimistic view.
As we will see, the optimistic view about property rights is on solid ground when its focus is on
particular pieces of property or government regulation regarding which we have detailed knowledge about evolutionary influences. In this Essay, I try to develop resistance to the natural but
unsubstantiated claim that the evolution of property rights is quite generally, or nearly always, a
thing to celebrate.
2 The conflicting stories are developed more fully in Saul Levmore, Two Stories about
the
Evolution of Property Rights, 31 J Legal Stud (forthcoming 2003).
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I. EVOLUTIONARY STORIES ABOUT PROPERTY

A. Optimistic and Skeptical Stories
The conventional story of the evolution of property begins with
hunters and gatherers in a forest or other commons. These protagonists develop customs and then laws about private property rightsmostly of the kind permitting an owner to exclude others-with respect to what they gather, kill, find, or fashion out of stone and wood
to further these aims. There is a technological or transaction cost element to this phase because it is a mighty task to exclude competitors
from a forest or ocean, but for the purpose of this Essay we can simply
think of the driving force as one of wealth creation. Those who gather
and hunt will work harder the more they can control the product of
their labor, and the community might find it worthwhile to respect
these ownership rules in order to maximize its total wealth.
As the population increases and intense agricultural production
becomes critical, the evolution of property rights is yet more driven by
consequences. Private property rights are now even more important in
encouraging effort because of a lag between the effort and the return.
A farmer will work hard if he knows that he will reap where he sowed.
Laws about trespass, boundaries, and riparian rights come into their
own, and even the more archaic of these rules have proved susceptible
to fairly convincing efficiency explanations. One version of the larger
story focuses on transaction costs; improvements (and lower costs) associated with fencing or irrigation or even recordation will raise the
value of farmland relative to open hunting ground, stimulating the
evolution toward private property rights. Another version focuses on
demand or product prices; agricultural yield is likely to be greater with
private plots than with a central planner or commons. In the interest
of brevity, I will emphasize the association between production incentives (and thus wealth creation) and secure property rights. And,
again, the conventional and optimistic story is that the emergence of
property rights in personal and real property has been a story of evolutionary success. Indeed, legal systems and economies that have
lagged, and experienced the gravest famines and rates of poverty, are
almost invariably (and sensibly) counseled to establish secure private
property rights.
There is room, however, for an alternative and more skeptical
depiction of the evolution of these property rights. This story is one of
interest groups, tribute, and grave market imperfections. For an appropriate beginning to this story about property rights, imagine (without pausing to ask how powerful authorities or governments come
about in the first place) a lawmaker who gives a charter covering a
large tract of land (previously claimed by the ruler or simply un-
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tamed) to an individual. If the recipient performed some great service
to the realm, then we might think of this land grant as part of an incentive system that is not so different from that which we associate
with the benefits of private property. But perhaps the grant is to kin,
to a comrade in arms, or to someone who pledges tribute. If private
property emerges under such circumstances, we have no reason to
think that it is to be celebrated as efficient or as providing socially superior incentives. When property rights are assigned because of political maneuvering (with less than unanimous agreement), there is the
danger that the development of these rights promotes inefficient behavior either on the part of those who seek to obtain wealth as the recipients of these assignments or by those who hope to gain indirectly
by redistributing rights to inefficient users from whom the lawmaker
can more easily collect taxes. Even the grant in return for future tribute is troubling. An optimist might see this as the auctioning off of
property to the highest valuing user, but the problem is that tax revenue is easier to extract from some uses of the property than from others.
Property rights change over time either because the alterations
maximize wealth, as the modern law and economics version would
suggest, or, more skeptically, because an interest group has successfully brought about a new regime. Thus, the acquisition and addition
of new land to a national park may reflect a decision to provide a public good in a way that yields or maintains the highest value of the land
in question or it may represent the victory of snowmobilers, concessionaires, or hiking clubs, each capable of benefiting from a public
subsidy of their interests while most citizens opposed to the park's expansion are too dispersed to do much about it. Similarly, new catch
limits in a fishery may solve collective action problems and maximize
the longterm value of the fishery- especially if they are transferable
rights-but these limits may instead reflect the political power of
nearby processing facilities or of those citizens who currently rely on
the fishery for their income. Quite generally, the evolution of property
rights and even their early emergence, as when Blackacre and
Whiteacre are carved out of an uncharted forest, may represent the efficient allocation of property to users who will maximize value once
they control output and access. But it is also possible that each evolutionary step reflects a bargain between the reigning authority and
some of the owners. Blackacre and Whiteacre may simply be more
easily taxed after their creation or in return for their creation than
3
The tax-and-property-rights authority might, for example, prefer a regime with a few
easily taxed property owners over one with many dispersed owners who are difficult to capture
in the tax system. And yet the latter scheme might produce more social benefit.
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were their precursors. An arrangement that appeals to the new owners
of these properties, and to the ruling authority, may come at the expense of the polity as a whole.
There are evolutionary pressures that prevent the interest group
story from straying too far from the optimistic, efficiency-oriented
one. Long-run survival is inconsistent with unfettered rent seeking and
redistribution toward well-positioned interest groups, because in the
long run, members of interest groups will be better off if the economy
as a whole is more successful. But the interest group and efficiency
stories are unlikely to converge. Evolution is path dependent, as each
step plays something of an irreversible role in determining the future.
For example, when parcels of private property are first carved out,
public roads and even legal decisions may follow in ways that track
these rights, and then new private investments and expectations will
build on these foundations, so that it becomes unlikely that the original property boundaries and assignments will ever be completely
obliterated.
B.

Explaining Intellectual Property Rights
1. The optimistic efficiency story.

This rivalry between the efficiency and interest group stories continues in the realm of intellectual property. A first-in-time rule of the
kind that has governed personal property, be it found (where there is
no original owner in the picture), hunted, or even securitized, has carried weight with respect to intellectual property, so that law has protected creators against later appropriation by others. But this interest
has been balanced, or somewhat weakened, by time limits and other
devices that favor the dissemination of new inventions, literary works,
and the like, if only to take advantage of the public good quality of
most intellectual property, such that one person's use does not normally interfere with another's.
At the risk of serious oversimplification, the tradeoff is between
private property rights that are granted in order to encourage innovation, and open access so as to maximize the gains from innovations
that are already, or that would anyway be, developed. One intuition is
that if we extend patent protection, copyright enforcement, and the
like, we will get more and better miracle drugs, good music, and improved business processes, mostly because innovators will respond
positively to the assurance of exclusive rights to profits-albeit for a
specified number of years. The contrary intuition is that by weakening
or eliminating these legal licenses to control and monopolize innovations, we will have not only wider and more efficient distribution of
new things, because the innovator's monopoly will be denied, but also
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more new things because successive innovators will freely be able to
build upon earlier advances. Open access to new knowledge may hasten innovations to market, because innovators may rush in order to
take advantage of their first-mover opportunities. Alternatively, open
access may be associated with stagnation, as innovators try to maintain their secrets in the absence of a system with registration and protection. The case for weak property rights is hardly absurd, and, indeed, it is easy to point to areas where there have been impressive innovation in spite of the fact that those innovations were not protected
with property rights. Insights about the "laws of nature" are unpatentable, and yet they seem to pour out of universities (a subsidized industry, to be sure) to the great benefit of society at large. No one was
able to appropriate the idea of the drive-thru window or the secret of
fire or the concept of (or recipe for) chocolate milk, and yet it is hard
to believe that with more secure property rights we would have more
or better such ideas.' Legal practice itself might offer a nice illustration
of the promise of progress in spite of weak property rights. New legal
arguments are cited, copied, and exploited as soon as the imitator
likes, and yet there is no apparent shortage of brief writers or of talented persons entering the field of law.5 Finally, there is the appealing
and contemporary claim that we have experienced sustained and impressive innovation precisely where there has been open source software.
It is thus easy to see that a society's progress may depend on finding the right balance between strong and weak property rights, but it is
also easy to see that the optimal rules may be impossible to ascertain.
In the fields of music and literature, for instance, the basic question is
whether to make authors and publishers more or less secure against
photocopying, downloading, and comparable uses. The argument for
stronger copyright is like the argument for a farmer's secure right to
Blackacre; a stronger claim on later profits is likely to induce investment and effort. The counterargument for open access, or knowledge,
is that wider dissemination of new works might bring about yet more
progress in the long run because each generation of creators will be
able to draw freely on earlier work, and their own efforts will be re-

4
Again, the pro-property rights view is that in the absence of legal protection, the secret
of fire was probably withheld as a clan or trade secret. Protection of ideas might lead to more
rapid dissemination. The drive-thru window, like the ambush, is thus interesting because it can
hardly be kept secret.
5
These rules affecting legal practice might reflect the great value we attach to dissemination, where we want equal justice to prevail, and so forth. But the point in the text is that there is
no striking shortage of new entrants and ideas despite the absence of property rights.
6
See Yochai Benkler, Coase's Penguin,or, Linux and the Nature of the Firm, 112 Yale L J
369 (2002) (associating creative incentives in an open source system with individual choice).

The University of Chicago Law Review

[70:181

warded to the extent that they can capture audiences before others
imitate them.!
2. The interest group story.
But all this can be recharacterized from the perspective of our alternative evolutionary story, which depicts property rights as the
product of interest group pressures. In the case of intellectual property, at least, the evidence of interest group agitation for the statutory
schemes we know, along with the indeterminacy of, or lack of empirical evidence underlying, the first evolutionary story give this second
and more skeptical story special force.8 Altogether, the efficiency diagnosis is probably less robust for intellectual property than it is for
personal or real property. Continuing with the copyright example, the
alternative evolutionary story is that copyright may have emerged because of the influence of publishers or well-connected authors who
gained by acquiring and extending their exclusive right to profit from
the compositions and materials they created and owned. And this
property right may become more or less secure in the future because
of the influence and (conflicting) efforts of trade groups, publishers,
universities, chains of copy stores, libraries, and others. The ongoing
possibility of legal and technological change has provided an incentive
for the formation of these groups, and the regular "losers," if they are
that, are likely to be the end users of these creations, who are widely
dispersed, not in communication with one another, and thus disadvantaged in the political process except to the extent that their potential
voting power matters. I return presently to this link between interest
groups and the apparent expansion of intellectual property rights.
3. Examples of the conflicting stories.
The argument in Part II emphasizes areas in which new property
is created, often because of technological change. In anticipation of
the argument below, and in order to provide a concrete example of the
idea advanced thus far, consider the development, or privatization as
it were, of the broadcast spectrum, a domain that we might think of as
sharing some characteristics with both real property and intellectual
7 The arguments are put forward in William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J Legal Stud 325,348 (1989) (exploring other incentives for
creation, pecuniary and non-pecuniary).
Interest groups are associated with new intellectual property rights in this way (though
8
without the asymmetry argument introduced in Part II.B). See William W.Fisher III, The Growth
of Intellectual Property: A History of the Ownership of Ideas in the United States II.C
(Mar 5, 1992), online at http://www.law.harvard.edu/AcademicAffairs/coursepages/tfisher/
iphistory.html (visited Dec 17, 2002) (concluding that "lobbying efforts have ... been biased in
favor of the expansion of intellectual property").
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property. The optimistic argument about government involvement and
the parceling of property on the spectrum is that some legal intervention was needed to prevent signal interference due to the overcrowding of the airwaves, much as regulation (or extensive and high transaction cost bargaining) might be needed to avoid over-fishing or pollution or traffic congestion in analogous settings where there looms a
tragedy of the commons. Any initial allocation, followed by transferability and limited regulation (as there is for real property), could
have produced a fairly decent result. In turn, the skeptical interest
group story is that the government took control of the spectrum and
then made allocation choices-and continues to regulate-not in the
"public interest" but rather to appease interest groups that sought
to
censor the broadcast media or even to chill criticism of the
government itself.9 It is unlikely that anyone would make a serious
claim that the evolution of these rights has been something to
celebrate as an example of spontaneous efficiency. Similarly, the
emergence of our patent system, our copyright law, and our
Blackacres may give little reason for exultation.
Real property rights also respond to technological changes' ° such
as new irrigation techniques, or to opening up new territory after exploration, but the changes that have come along recently in the world
of intellectual property-such as photocopiers, compact disc burners,
and peer-to-peer file sharing technologies that affect the value and
dynamics of copyright-have been rather dramatic and rapid. Intellectual property rights are especially interesting because new technologies change the balance between inducements for the creators and
dissemination to users. As new copying technologies come about, for
example, the best default rules for copyright protection are likely to
change; they may tilt toward allowing increasingly inevitable dissemination or instead towards protecting creators, as it becomes yet harder
to appropriate a substantial portion of the gains from one's creation
because controlling access becomes more difficult. At the same time,
interest group dynamics change as firms and other entities adjust to
new technologies. By way of illustration, courts have, in recent years,
permitted home copying of commercial television and movies but
then not permitted Napster to continue to facilitate the downloading

9 See Thomas W. Hazlett, The Rationality of the US. Broadcast Spectrum, 33 J L & Econ
133, 161, 164-70, 175 (1990) (noting that "self-interested rationality" of interest groups influenced the development of the broadcast spectrum).
10 All property rights are likely to evolve with technological change, either because (from
an efficiency perspective) the best default rules depend on technological realities as well as
transaction costs (which themselves change with technological advances), or because political interests and the relative ability of groups to organize change with technology.
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of music by users who paid nothing to the creators." These evolutionary movements can be understood as twists and turns in response to
changes in relative transaction costs but they can alternatively and
rather plainly be attributed to interest groups and perceived political
advantage. 2
These examples illustrate the optimistic and the skeptical stories
regarding the evolution of property rights. The optimistic one is of the
standard law and economics variety, and it suggests alterations in
rights in response to technological changes-especially where adjustments are not easily made through private bargains. To take an extreme but illustrative hypothetical, if technological change made it
feasible for millions of citizens to live and work deep underground, we
might expect some reshuffling of property rights in land -much as air
rights were redefined when air travel became feasible. This is more
likely if the underground construction involves coordinating the interests of many property owners, because otherwise simple bargains
should be expected. The essential point, then, is that wealthmaximizing property rights are likely to adjust here and there with
technological changes. In turn, the second story sketched here offers a
more skeptical depiction of the evolution of property rights, as it focuses on interest groups and, therefore, the expectation that political
(and litigation) power will not be distributed evenly across the population or even the economy. Technological changes play an important
role in this story as well; a new technology (such as one associated
with underground living) might create a powerful new industry, or an
existing interest group might try to fight off a new technology with
regulatory hurdles. But in each case, the new political bargain may or
may not be socially beneficial.
With these alternative stories, I have not claimed that interest
groups always generate inefficient property rights and assignments.
Even a selfish ruler will be more inclined to favor interests that generate more wealth, because the greater the economic pie, the greater the
slice that the ruler can extract. Correspondingly, interest groups may
overachieve because they are better positioned to overcome collective
action problems than are their competitors, but, other things equal,
political effort and influence are likely to be associated with produc11 See Sony Corp of America v Universal City Studios, Inc, 464 US 417,456 (1984) (allowing home recording of commercial broadcasts); A&M Records, Inc v Napster, nc, 284 F3d 1091,
1095 (9th Cir 2002) (upholding an injunction against the peer-to-peer file-sharing Napster system).
12 Note the implication, in accord with much of the positive political theory literature -but
not explored here-that interest groups can work through courts as well as legislatures. I do not
claim that these cases were perfectly predictable. Home recording pitted organized interest
groups against one another, although by the time the case was decided there were also millions
of voters strongly in favor of open access.
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tive activity. It is for this reason that I label the interest group story
skeptical rather than pessimistic. Property rights that emerge from
such activity may or may not be socially desirable (even apart from
the rent seeking that takes place in pursuit of these rights), but the
picture is much less sanguine than the one usually painted with the
commons receding in the background and hard-working tillers of land
dominating the foreground.
Nor am I suggesting that we should always be agnostic about the
relative merits of the two evolutionary stories. Interest group activity
can be good, bad, or neutral. In a given situation, we might know
enough about local history to regard the evolutionary process as efficient or, to the contrary, as sadly demonstrating the power of overachieving interest groups in the face of high transaction costs. For example, in areas where property rights have evolved to a congruent position in a variety of legal systems we might be fairly optimistic about
the evolutionary path we have taken. But in many spheres it is probably difficult to know whether to rejoice or fret over the property rights
that have emerged. And agnostic as we might be about property's path
to the present, there is the question of what to expect of its future. It is
to this subject that I now turn.
II. PROPERTY'S FUTURE AND THE BOUNDARIES OF IDEAS

A. The Idea/Device Distinction
All readers of law reviews know that a property right, in the form
of a patent, is available to one who invents a machine or device or
possibly a process that is new, useful, and nonobvious, but is not available to one who simply has a terrific idea for a machine, for social organization, for law reform, and so forth.13 Similarly, we copyright expressions but not mere ideas. This idea/device (and, in the case of
copyright, idea/expression) distinction, as I will call it, is occasionally
fuzzy and certainly unstable." For example, mathematical algorithms
cannot be patented, but computer programs and some fairly abstract
advances in chemistry can. More generally, current law offers new
hope for the creators of ideas, so that one who designs a new financial

practice or develops a new swimming stroke might gain a patent. Patentability, however, still requires the practice or stroke to be novel,
nonobvious (to a person of ordinary skill in the art), and useful (so
that it is not merely an abstract idea), though the creation of private
property rights in this manner was once thought inconceivable." The
See Patent Act of 1952,35 USC § 101 et seq (2000).
This distinction is one that might be explained based on incentives to creators, but I
leave that topic for another day.
15 See Diamond v Diehr,450 US 175, 192-93 (1981) (finding a process for curing synthetic
13
14
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fuzziness and instability are exacerbated by technological change if
only because change upsets settled conceptions of the line between
ideas and devices. I draw attention to the treatment of ideas simply to
lay the foundation for a claim that property rights will expand over
the coming years. In particular, we should expect increased protection
for the creators of ideas, abstract or not. This expansion comes not
only because of technological changes, but also, and more interestingly
perhaps, because of an asymmetry in interest group activity and likely
success. As we will see, the argument applies with much greater force
to intellectual than to real property.
B.

Interest Group Asymmetry

My argument builds on the idea that interest groups will often
defend existing rights or subsidies more aggressively and successfully
than they will obtain new ones. There might be a psychological, or loss
aversion, element to this, and there might be an element of capital
market failure, because a right might produce revenue with which to
defend it, while a potential right might require borrowed funds to acquire. But my central argument goes to the heart of interest group
theory and builds on the notion that it is easier to organize a group
that is identifiable than it is to organize one that is dispersed and less
identifiable, or merely probabilistic. Interest group activity as to property rights is likely to be asymmetrical in the sense that groups will do
better at protecting their rights than they will at organizing in order to
obtain new ones. I begin with a stylized example from real property.
Consider the prototypical example of a firm, F,that thinks of combining forces with like firms, G through J, in order to gain favorable trade
treatment or gain the right to use public lands at low cost for their private purposes. We might imagine that success is plausible but uncertain. Consumers and competitor industries might rise up and oppose
Fs plan, and these interests do represent more voters and a greater
economic stake (because of the presumed deadweight loss associated
with the interest group grab), but these potential losers are also normally more dispersed and difficult to organize. Still, our political entrepreneur, F, can hardly be sure of success. Some members of Fs inrubber patentable in spite of the fact that the process involved the use of a computer program);
State Street Bank v Signature FinancialGroup, 149 F3d 1368, 1375 (Fed Cir 1998) (overturning
the "business method" exception to patentability); Dale D. Miller, Method of Putting,U.S. Patent
No 5,616,089 (Mar 29, 1996) ("A method of putting features the golfer's dominant hand so that
the golfer can improve control over putting speed and direction.") (abstract). See also John R.
Thomas, The Patenting of the Liberal Professions,40 BC L Rev 1139, 1143 (1999) (recommending excluding from patent protection subject matter based on "the aesthetic, social observations
or personal skill"); Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents before Breakfast: Property Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 Berkeley Tech L J 577, 581-82
(1999) (describing the history of these new developments).
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tended group might hope to freeride and, therefore, not actively participate in the political activity, or they might decline to join forces for
fear that the benefit produced by this political activity will redound to
some of the firms in the group but not theirs. Even if the collective action problem among these firms can be overcome, the effort might
simply fail; politicians might rather appeal to numerous voters than to
a few sources of campaign funds, or consumer groups might get wind
of the plan and make the defeat of this grab for power by F and the
other firms a high priority issue. But if the stars are correctly aligned,
political success is possible.
And what about the likelihood of a later campaign to undo this
favorable treatment for one interest group, consisting of that handful
of firms, F through J? These five firms will be enjoying a new property
right and it is easy to see that once the new "right" is in hand, the
group will have less trouble maintaining it than it had acquiring it, if
only because the member firms will now perfectly identify themselves
as beneficiaries of this regime of rights. Firm G might originally have
feared that the acquired benefit would redound to Fs gain but not to
G's, but once G is in the winning coalition, it is obvious that the loss of
the right will be costly to it. And it will continue to be the case that no
small group of easily organized actors will have much incentive to
take on the task of undoing this right because the benefits of such a
reversal are likely to be widely dispersed. The most obvious losers are
consumers or taxpayers, as they suffer from the most serious of collective action problems. In other settings, new property rights may be as
easy to acquire as to maintain, but it will be quite rare for rights to be
undone at a faster clip than they are created. This asymmetry, which
obviously suggests the expansion of property rights over the long
term, is more pronounced when the right is constitutionally protected,
as when it is deemed to be a property interest that, if taken for public
use (which may simply amount to its recapture into the commons),
obliges the government to pay just compensation. In short, there is an
endowment effect, or interest group asymmetry, as we might call it,
which suggests an expansion of property rights over time.
With respect to real property, it will often be the case that new
rights are effectively opposed by organized groups because most new
rights come at the expense of old rights, in which case the potential
losers are identifiable. If F seeks to bar imports of products that compete with Fs,then we can expect the affected importers to organize as
well as F,but in opposition to the restriction. And if F and other firms
aim to use public lands, but that land was previously open for logging,
then we can expect the logging industry to do battle with F. If it is
nevertheless the case that property rights expand, which is to say new
rights are created out of old ones, then it is likely that transaction costs

The University of Chicago Law Review

[70:181

play an important role. When air rights were made available to commercial air traffic, for example, they were in a sense carved out of fee
simple properties down below, but the obvious transaction costs of
bargaining with all these property owners made the emergence of
these "new" air rights predictable and sensible. 6
Interest groups that face organized opposition will do better to
avoid battling over property rights, and turn their attention to incremental gains in the form of favorable regulations, deregulations, tax
rates, government contracts, environmental rules, subsidies, and so
forth. On occasion, there will be room to agitate for new property
rights, as when a firm looks to exploit public land where there is no
organized opposition. For the most part, the strategy will be to agitate
where there is interest group asymmetry, which is to say where the
costs of what they propose will fall on dispersed, unidentifiable, or
disorganized interests-and this usually implies incremental regulatory changes rather than a re-carving of property rights. These regulatory changes do, of course, redefine property rights, and in some sense
every property right is nothing more than what the law makes of it
with various rules and taxes. But the essential point is that we should
expect an expansion of property rights only until they mature, and
identifiable owners control all available rights. Beyond that point,
there will be occasional, dramatic responses to technological changes,
but no particular reason to expect continuing expansion.
In the area of intellectual property, however, technological
changes and ideas themselves create new economic pies and legal
frontiers. As such, an expansion of property rights is to be expected
because of the interest group asymmetry. If K develops an idea for a
new product, it will often be the case that those who stand to lose
from K's gaining a legal right to this idea are unidentifiable. Over
time, innovators like K will agitate for new and greater property rights
through legislative channels and through litigation in which courts are
asked to interpret existing statutes in ways that benefit new creators."
Groups that organize in favor of expanded intellectual property rights
have the advantage of facing no clear efficiency argument for one
level of rights or another. The basic and difficult tension between the
goal of inducing creation and that of encouraging dissemination
16
See, for example, Clement L. Bouv6, Private Ownership of Airspace, 1 Air L Rev 232,
249-50 (1930) (discussing the absurdity of applying the usque ad coelum maxim, which is to say,
trespass by acts above the surface, literally); Annotation, Trespass by Acts Above Surface, 42
ALR 945,949 (1926) (collecting and discussing cases applying usque ad coelum).
17 Organized groups may see the threat of legislation and litigation and rise up to do battle
with the identifiable claimant of a new right. But the point in the text is that there is virtually always a well-organized interest guarding against the formation of new property rights at the expense of old, real property rights, while in the arena of intellectual property this is less so.
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(where additional users of intellectual property normally take nothing
away from inframarginal users) has produced no obvious optimum. In
contrast, a good case can be made on wealth maximization grounds
for a fee simple in Blackacre, because a single owner can internalize
costs and benefits, has incentive to maximize value, and so forth. But
no such case can be made for a simple and complete right to an invention or expression. Against an uncertain efficiency baseline, we might
expect interest groups to have more success because decisionmakers
can easily camouflage their handouts as efficient balancing decisions
or simply award new property rights in the belief that more inducement for creation is better-with no organized opposition pushing the
case for free knowledge and wider dissemination.
Nowhere are these arguments more likely to be true than with
respect to ideas. The interest group asymmetry idea suggests that we
should expect sporadic agitation for a property right in a (mere)
idea-because the winners are identifiable and the exploitation of the
idea will often not identifiably impede on an existing set of easily organized holders of property rights. And, of course, once there is a
property right in an idea, abstract or otherwise, it will be harder to
undo than to maintain because of the asymmetry discussed earlier.
Over time, then, we should expect increasing protection for ideas. The
expansion may slow if and when these protected ideas constitute a
substantial barrier to new innovators who must bargain with the previous generations of innovators in order to use and advance their
ideas. " But property rights can expand a great deal before there is
substantial opposition on this (transaction cost) ground, and then it is
also possible that some coordinated licensing scheme (as exists in the
music industry) will develop by contract or through other means in
order to deal with assorted, earlier creators of ideas."
Put differently, we can think of ideas as a constant source of new
frontiers. The opening position, or default rule, is that such frontiers as
the deep seas, the Moon, and new ideas are unavailable for private
exploitation; we do not expect our legal system to grant monopolies in
18

On the idea that numerous earlier rights holders will form an obstacle to later progress,

see Michael A. Heller, The Boundariesof Private Property,108 Yale L J 1163, 1222 (1999) (indicating that resource fragmentation and judicial expansion of private property interests result in
waste and inefficiency); Michael A. Heller and Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 Sci 698,698-99 (1998) (arguing that "a spiral of overlapping patent claims in the hands of different owners" could diminish biomedical innovation). See also Clarisa Long, Proprietary Rights and Why Initial Allocations Matter, 49
Emory L J 823,827 (2000) (exploring transaction costs as barriers to renegotiation of intellectual
property rights).
19 For an optimistic account, see Robert P Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules:
Intellectual Property Rights and Collective Rights Organizations,84 Cal L Rev 1293, 1295 (1996)
(exploring how privately-established organizations in different industries emerge to reduce the
transaction costs associated with intellectual property licensing).
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claims to these frontiers or to enforce the results of a spontaneous
race to lay claim to these frontiers. But over time we should expect
bits and pieces of each of these frontiers to become privatized. The optimistic story will be that the owner of Moonacre has optimal incentive to maximize its value. The skeptical story will be that the owner of
Moonacre struck a deal with the government authority and that this
owner was advantaged in the political process as compared to dispersed losing interests. And once Moonacre is in existence, the interest
group asymmetry (buoyed by the right to just compensation) reminds
us that this property right will be difficult to undo. The same is true of
ideas, and of course it is these ideas, rather than pieces of the moon,
which we can expect to come into play and to dominate our economy - and interest group activity - in the future.
CONCLUSION

There are signs that property rights in ideas are up for grabs
where no such rights seemed possible before. Potential owners of
rights in ideas may at first have an easier time through litigation
(where expansion can easily proceed one step at a time) than through
legislation, and we might optimistically expect property rights to
emerge precisely where the idea/device distinction seems weakest.
Each new right might be awarded where an idea was created through
substantial investment, and not serendipity, so that an efficiencyminded judge was tempted to create a new property right so as to
provide inducements to future creators who might expect like wisdom
in the future. Over time the action will shift to the legislature, and
here the two evolutionary stories will be tested.
I have suggested that in the realm of intellectual property we are
in for dramatic changes of the sort that took place in the world of real
property when new continents were "discovered" and where rights
were otherwise made possible without powerful opposition. Our
drama will take place where interest groups focus on previously unpatentable and otherwise unprotectable innovations and ideas. Perhaps the most optimistic thing to say about this potential explosion of
intellectual property rights is that regardless of how apt the skeptical
story of the history of property rights has been, we have not done so
badly as a legal system, and economies governed by ours and related
legal systems have fared well. Property rights may have been assigned,
privatized, regulated, and even occasionally recaptured for a commons, but so long as these rights remain transferable there has been
and will be decent opportunity for efficiency to win out in the long
run.
Another ground for optimism is that when interest groups do
much more harm than good, our political system encourages compet-
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ing interest groups to form, and sometimes even encourages political
entrepreneurs who can benefit from the affections of numerous voters
or from the economic activity that is unleashed when sensible policies
are pursued. If interest groups obtain property rights that are dramatically inefficient, there will be great wealth to be enjoyed from the
dismantling of these rights, and we should expect our political system,
and even our interest groups, to see us to this result. Similarly, whatever happens in the realm of ideas, and whatever evolutionary path
our property rights take, we can rely on private bargains and our larger political and legal system to make the journey manageable if not
downright attractive. The journey may go much better if we are careful as to how we characterize the path we have followed to the present.
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